Over the last decades a transition from a state-own monopoly to a private business took place in the Spanish fuel sector. To figure out whether downstream prices react differently to upstream price increases than to price decreases, alternative dynamic nonlinear and asymmetric error correction models are applied to weekly price data. This paper analyse the existence of price asymmetries in the fuel market in Spain during the 2011-2016 period. In comparison with traditional asymmetric price theory literature, this paper introduces a new double threshold error correction (ECM) model (DT-ECM) and new double logistic ECM models and compares them with more common linear ECM, time varying parameter models (TV-ECM), threshold autoregressive models (T-ECM), smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) models and nonlinear error correction (Logistic-ECM) and double threshold Logistic (DT-Logistic ECM). The asymmetric results found in Spain in the oil sector, show that sophisticated bivariate short-run nonlinearities are present in the gasoline market prices and that those price reactions depend on two main aspects; whether the oil price increases or decreases and on the stage (above of below) of the prices of gasoline relative to their long-run expected crude oil prices (error correction term). Those empirical results are consistent with the economic explanations based on market power-collusion and/or with consumer having search costs.
Introduction
Price determination in the fuel market has been a controversial issue during the last decades. In most economies, the fuel sector has been accused of having high market power and, as a result, of carrying non-competitive practices. Particularly, it has been argued that fuel prices suffer from asymmetric price rigidity. When input costs increase, output price raises faster; however, when input costs decrease, output prices adjust more slowly. This phenomenon is called "asymmetric price transmission," informally known as "rockets and feathers." The existence of these asymmetries is undesirable since it can be detrimental for consumers and it can lead to efficiency losses.
Competition authorities, especially with regard to the retail gasoline market, have repeatedly targeted the Spanish automotive fuel sector. On the one hand, at national level, the CNMC 1 has pointed out the lack of competition in the sector. With this regard, the CNMC has fined Repsol, Cepsa and BP for fixing prices in their petrol stations for several times (Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia, 2015) . On the other hand, at supranational level, the European Commission presented its concerns about some practices such as the Repsol vertical agreements, accused of practicing exclusive dealing contracts (European Commission, 2006) .
Asymmetric price transmission has been studied for several markets across the world but it has been focused on the fuel market. In the case of US, different studies deal with this topic. The most common way to tackle the presence of the rockets and feathers phenomenon is following the pioneering work of Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997) . Using weekly data for different states during [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , they create an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) and an Error Correction Model (ECM). The results of these empirical models show that the adjustments of spot and retail gasoline prices to changes in weekly crude oil prices are asymmetric. However, when using daily data for the same period, Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) detect no asymmetries in price transmission. Balke, Brown, and Yücel (1998) , found evidence for a persistent asymmetry through an ECM during 1987 -1997 . Deltas (2008 showed that retail gasoline prices respond faster to wholesale price increases than decreases. He suggests that sticky prices and response asymmetries are consequences of retail market power. If market power leads to higher price-cost margins, it is more likely that their price dynamics tend to be beneficial Alvaro Escribano is the corresponding author. ©2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.
In 1985, the liberalisation and privatisation processes began with the 5/1985 Royal Decree. This change in the legislation made possible the creation of a parallel network of private petrol stations. Thereafter, the 4/1988 and 4/1991 Royal Decrees reduced the distances between service stations, with the aim of increasing the competition levels in the sector.
From 1992 onwards, the liberalisation process has become more important with the 34/1992 law, which approved the freedom of this economic activity in all its segments. One year later, the authorities got rid of the minimum distances law. In 1998, the liberalisation of petrol prices arrived together with the free access to the oil product logistical network, CLH. 4 
Characteristics of the market
The fuel market is a complex sector made up of several stages from the extraction of crude oil until the production, distribution and sale of gasoline to final consumers (see Figure 1) . One of the main characteristics of the fuel market is that it is highly concentrated, especially in Spain (see Table 1 ). To measure the degree of concentration of firms in the oil market in Spain, we make use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) obtained by adding up the squares of the market shares of each firm in the market. According to the US regulation, having a HHI higher than 1800 would imply that the market is concentrated. The Spanish HHI of service stations in 2012 was 2105, which is lower than previous recorded years. For instance, in 2009, the Spanish HHI had more than 2500 points, the second highest within Europe, only surpassed by Portugal (Comisión Nacional de la Energía, 2012). In the same vein, the Lerner-index 5 is assumed to be high for most of the firms acting in this market due to price inelastic demand for fuel products and high firm's market share of Repsol, Cepsa and BP (see Table 1 ).
Figure 1:
Price formation along the production-distribution chain. Note: The single stage approach shows how final retail prices (R) are related with crude oil prices (CR). However, the twostage methodology divides the price transmission in two stages. The first stage associates spot gasoline prices (S) with crude oil prices given by the Brent Barrel (CR). The second stage described the relationship between retail prices (R) and spot gasoline prices (S). Source: Comisión Nacional de los mercados y la competencia.
The main leader is Repsol CPP, 6 which is a Spanish company that belongs to the Repsol-YPF 7 group. It owns more than 4500 service stations in Spain, Portugal and Italy. The firm is vertically integrated across the whole supply and distribution chain. It covers from the refining process until the fuel distribution to final consumers through its own service stations and agreements with other operators. COCO, CODO, DODO, tenancy and usufruct contracts 8 form part of the notified agreements, investigated by the European Commission for its potential non-competitive clauses. European Commission (2001) argued that some of these notified agreements are long-term exclusive dealing contracts, which could give rise to foreclosure or lock-in effects.
Another important aspect of the fuel market is related to the transport of these products. If the fuel transportation industry is not competitive enough, the fuel distribution costs could increase, leading to foreclosure effects. The most efficient middle-and long-distance transport mean in Spain is the oil pipeline, which market is a natural monopoly. During a long period of time, it has been regarded as the bottleneck of the liberalised Spanish oil market. Nonetheless, there have been diverse changes in the regulation to address this problem. As a result, the Spanish pipeline market is in hands of CLH. To avoid possible discriminatory transportation costs, the company is owned by fuel distributors. In this way, new retailers can have access to the transport market in the same conditions as the old ones. However, following the reasoning of Adams and Brock (1983) , this measure can still have a foreclosure effect since CLH can establish a high minimum volume to enter the transport industry together with disproportional quality control that only big companies can guarantee.
Methodology

Data
In order to study the potential asymmetric price transmissions in the Spanish fuel market, weekly data from the first week of January 2011 until the second week of April 2016 is used, which involves 277 observations. The variables employed in this paper are the price of crude oil (CR), the €/$ exchange rate (ER), the gasoline spot price (S) and the pre-tax retail price of 95 octane gasoline (RS for Spanish retail price). The abbreviations of the variables in capital letters refer to the series in levels and lowercase letters represent the series in logarithms (cr, er, s and rs).
For crude oil prices, the weekly Europe Brent Spot Price FOB ($ per barrel) from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) is used, transformed into $/1000 L. The exchange rate is obtained from the FRED. To measure the gasoline spot price, the approximation (€/tons) of the CNMC is applied. 9 The pre-tax retail price chosen is an average of the 95 octane gasoline prices (€/litre) provided by the CNMC as well. The last two variables are transformed 10 into €/1000 L.
The plots of the price variables in Figure 2 show the relationship between crude oil prices and gasoline prices at different stages of the production-distribution chain for the 95-octane gasoline. The difference between the price series (S) and (CR_EUROS) can be a proxy of the margin in the first stage of the production-distribution chain, whereas the price difference between (RS) and (S) is a proxy for the margin in the second stage. 
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics give us a quick intuition about whether the variables of interest are potentially symmetric or asymmetric.
Univariate statistics for the first differences of the series in levels and in logarithms are represented in Table  2 and Table 3 , respectively. We evaluate if the change in prices is normally distributed (Gaussian distribution) or not. Jarque-Bera tests shows how the sample data do not always match the skewness and kurtosis of the Normal distribution. In most of the cases where variables are not normally distributed, the median is greater than the mean and very asymmetric and the skewness is negative meaning that their distributions are leftskewed. Therefore, the mass of the distribution is concentrated on the right of the histogram axis and the left tail is fatter. The variables e, v and u represent the residuals obtained when estimating the cointegration equations (12)- (13) of Section 3.4 by FM-OLS.
Nonlinear and asymmetric dynamic models with linear cointegrated variables
As was mentioned in Section 2, the fuel market is a complex sector made up of several stages from the extraction of crude oil until the production, distribution and sale of gasoline to final consumers. Therefore, it is crucial to study not only whether asymmetries exist but also in which segment of the market they occur. The vast majority of the rockets and feathers investigations developed an ECM methodology due to the presence of cointegration between downstream and upstream prices.
Symmetric long-run (LR) relationship:
Let * be the desired long-run equilibrium prices. If the variables p t and x t are I(1) and the equilibrium error term ecm t is I(0), then the variables are cointegrated. If ecm t > 0 ( + ) this means that the actual price p t is above the expected long-run equilibrium price * = ( / , ) = 0 + ′ and future prices should decrease to compensate the disequilibrium. When ecm t < 0 ( − ) the actual price p t is below the expected long-run equilibrium price and we expect future prices to increase to correct the disequilibrium.
We also would like to check if the adjustment to the cointegrating errors (ecm t − 1 ) is symmetric or asymmetric around the equilibrium (equal to 0). For symmetry, we expect the percentage number of positive ecm t − 1 values (prices p t higher than the expected long-run value of the crude oil) to be close to the percentage number of negative values of ecm t − 1 (prices p t lower than the expected long run value of the crude oil).
Two conditions are critical to have dynamic symmetric price movements in error correction models:
a. The short-run dynamics are symmetric and b. The equilibrium correction speed is linear and symmetric towards the equilibrium.
In equation (2) below we relax the above two restrictions, allowing the asymmetric behaviour to affect both the dynamics and the error correction terms (ecm t − 1 ) in a nonlinear way. Good books reviewing similar nonlinear time series models and nonlinear error correction models are provided by Franses and Dijk (2000) , Dufrénot and Mignon (2002) , and Teräsvirta, Tjostheim, and Granger (2010) . General model: Nonlinear in the Dynamics and Nonlinear in the Error Correction term
where a i (L) and c j (L) in equation (2) are finite order polynomials in the lag operator L, and with all roots outside the unit circle. However in the empirical application of this paper to the gasoline prices in Spain, we observe linear behaviour in the dynamics of the variables Δp and Δq, but nonlinearities affecting only the error correction terms from two main different sources; (i) the sign of the ecm t − 1 and (ii) whether the crude oil (cr) is increasing (Δ + if Δcr ≥ 0 and zero otherwise) or decreasing (Δ − if Δ < 0 and zero otherwise). We name those models, as bivariate nonlinear error correction models (BNEC), equation (3).
Bivariate Nonlinear Error Correction (BNEC)
Six different linear and nonlinear parameterizations of error correction models are estimated in Table 6 - Table  8 with linear and nonlinear equilibrium correction terms given by: Model 1: Linear Error Correction Model (LINEAR-ECM), Engle and Granger (1987) , Escribano (1986) , Granger and Lee (1989) , and Escribano and Granger (1998)
Model 4: Momentum Error Correction Model (M-ECM), Enders and Granger (1998) , Escribano and Granger (1998) , and Escribano and Pfann (1998) ,
Model 5: Double Threshold with Momentum Error Correction Model (DTM-ECM)
Model 6: 4th Order polynomial Error Correction Model (4th POL-ECM), Escribano (1986 Escribano ( , 2004 )
Decision rule to select between Logistic or Exponential smooth transition: Based on Jordá (1999, 2001) , and Teräsvirta (1994) in Model 6, if the minimum p-value is obtained for rejecting the null hypothesis H 0 = β 1 = β 3 = 0 (relative to the p-value of H 0 ) then the model is Logistic. However, if the minimum p-value is obtained rejecting the null hypothesis H 0 = β 2 = β 4 = 0 (relative to the p-value of H 0 ) then the model is Exponential. In fact, the empirical estimation of equation (9), at the three stages indicated in Section 3.4, the parameters β 2 and β 4 were always insignificant. Therefore, in all the oil price models estimated here, the selected smooth transition specifications are always LOGISTIC, equations (10) or (11) .
Model 7: Smooth Transition Error Correction Models (LOGISTIC-ECM), Teräsvirta and Eliasson (2001) ,
Similar nonlinear models to equation (10) but with the possibility of affecting also the linear dynamic parameters are for example discussed in Teräsvirta and Eliasson (2001) . In this paper, the following bivariate extension of this model provides the best explanation of gasoline prices in Spain; see equation (11) below. Model 8: Double Threshold Logistic Error Correction Models (DT-LOGISTIC-ECM)
) .
Long-run equilibrium prices and cointegration
The first step towards estimating an ECM is to check the order of integration of the series to be sure if they are stationary. Table 4 shows the results of using Dickey and Fuller (1979) tests for unit roots, augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests where we find, as expected, that all log-variables are integrated of order one, I(1). 11 (1) and if rejected the I(2) hypothesis then we test I(1) against I(0). With the ADF, in Table 4 we test the order of integration of the series under different determinist elements in the ADF. (i): first with intercept and time trend; (ii): second with intercept only: (iii): third with neither intercept nor trend. We reject that the prices are I(2) against I(1), or that first difference of the prices are I(1) with all p-values from Mackinnon (1996) equal to 0, see the second and fourth rows of Table 4 . Then we tested if the prices are I(1) against I(0) and in the three cases, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of unit root based on the critical values of Mackinnon (1996) , with non-significant trend or intercept terms under the null. Therefore, from the results of Table 4 we conclude that: a) we reject that oil prices are I (2) and that b) we cannot reject that all the variables are I(1), see rows one and three of Table 4 . Therefore, from now on in the empirical application we consider that all prices and the exchange rate are all I(1) and that no trend component is needed in the cointegrating relationships.
To model the segmentation of the oil market discussed before, we will focus on a two-stage process: Firststage, where the potential asymmetries are transmitted from crude oil prices (cr) to gasoline spot prices (s) as shown in equation (12) . The second-stage, equation (13) , analyse the possible asymmetric transmission mechanism going from the gasoline spot prices (s) to the final retail gasoline prices in Spain (rs). Equations (12)- (14) express the long-run cointegrating relationships between the upstream and downstream prices formation together with the exchange rate (er).
First-stage cointegration (upstream price relationship)
Second-stage cointegration (downstream price relationship)
The single-stage approach of equation (14), obtained substituting (12) into (13), is not so transparent in the transmission of price effects since it captures, the combined effects. However, following the tradition of the literature on the rockets and feathers phenomenon, a single stage approach will also be carried out. Single-stage cointegration
Given that all the variables have a unit root, are I (1),if a linear combination of them is stationary, I(0), the variables are cointegrated. As shown in Table 5 , there is evidence against the residuals being I(1), meaning that series are cointegrated. These long-run relationships are consistently estimated by both OLS and FM-OLS. However, we rely on the Fully Modified Least Squares (FM-OLS) parameter estimates rather than OLS, to achieve bias reductions and to get valid efficiency 12 improvements to directly test the significance of the cointegration coefficients 13 of equations (12)- (14), even with nonstationary variables in the regression. The Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration tests of Table 5 , were carried out to decide on the existence of long-run relationships between input price and output prices, based on the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) based on the estimated residualŝ,̂, and̂; the residuals from the cointegrating regressions, equations (12)- (14). The stars ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The Engle-Granger test reject he null hypothesis (no-cointegration) in all cases at 1%, using MacKinnon critical values, against the alternative of stationarity. Therefore, we will consider that the residuals are I(0) and the variables cointegrated.
Nonlinear and asymmetric error correction models
According to the Granger's Representation Theorem, the presence of a cointegrating relation implies that a valid ECM exists. However, it is not clear whether the error correction adjustment (equilibrium correction) is linear as in Engle and Granger (1987) or is nonlinear/asymmetric as in Escribano (1986 Escribano ( , 2004 , Escribano and Granger (1998) and Escribano and Pfann (1998) . In this section, the different error correction models (2) to (11) are estimated. As will become clear in what follows, our results show that the main source of asymmetries are coming from the impact of the ecm(-1) terms and not from the dynamics of the autoregressive distributed lags (ARDL) variables in first differences. Therefore, we will concentrate on the results obtained estimating the nonlinear dynamic equations (3)- (11). Table 5 , includes the results of the first stage cointegrating relationship, where the spot price (s) is run as a function of the crude oil (cr) and the exchange rate (er) which generates the equilibrium errors (ecm) that are used lagged once in Table 6 . The second column of Table 6 shows the results of the single equation linear ecm(-1) model (LINEAR-ECM) during the first stage relating the crude oil prices (cr) and the exchange rate (er) with the spot price (s). The third column allows the parameters of the ecm(-1) term to change (TV-ECM) with de rate of growth of the crude oil, this nonlinearity is significant and the model improves relative to the linear ECM in terms of the information criteria (AIC, BIC, HQ). The threshold ECM (T-ECM) is significant only with the positive ecm(-1) errors and the information criteria are worse than those of the TV-ECM. A new double threshold model (DT-ECM) is suggested where we allow the previous ecm(-1) terms from the T-ECM to change also depending on whether the crude oil prices are increasing or decreasing and both are significant and the information criteria improve. The next model estimated is 4th order polynomial in terms of the rate of growth of the crude oil prices. In order to select between a Logistic or an exponential smooth transition regression model we follow the decisions rule of Teräsvirta (1994) and Escribano and Jordá (2001) . Table 6 : ECM of the first-stage (in logs) from 01-2011 to 04-2016 (weekly data). Whenever the coefficients were not significant and leaving them in the model implied worse values for the information criteria, we eliminate them to improve efficiency. In bold letters we indicate the best models.
Spot prices (s) as a function of crude oil prices (cr) and exchange rate (er)
LIN-ECM
IA-ECM A-ECM M-ECM DT-ECM 4th POL-ECM
LOGIST. ECM
DT-LOGIST. ECM
The selected smooth transition ECM model is LOGISTIC since only the odd powers are significant in the previous 4th order Polynomial regression. The estimation results of this Logistic (LOGIST-ECM) models are showed in the previous to the last column of Table 6 and in terms of the information criteria (BIC and HQ) is the best specification of all models. This Logistic ECM model has a three dimensional adjustment depending on two variables; ecm t − 1 and Δcr t (see Figure 3) . The reaction to ecm(-1) is close to 0 when the rate of growth of the price of crude oil is negative. However, when the crude oil price increases the error correction adjustment term ecm(-1) becomes significant. This asymmetry is clearly seen when we project the adjustments in only two dimensions in Figure 4 and Figure 5 . In particular, Figure 4 shows clearly that the equilibrium adjustment is active only for increasing crude oil prices but is 0 otherwise (no correction to the expected long run spot price). Finally, Figure 5 shows that more times is the ecm(-1) positive than negative and that the range of positive ecm(-1) error is larger than the negative ones. Just the opposite asymmetric behaviour is observed in the second stage when relating the spot oil prices (s) with the retail prices to compensate (rs). This is so to compensate and reduce the otherwise dramatic asymmetric price reactions that would be clearly identify as a market failure due to market power, see estimates in Table 7 and Figure 6 - Figure 8 . Notice however that in this second stage the last two columns of Table 7 logistic-ECM represent NEC models are observationally equivalent. The previously mentioned net effect becomes clear when we estimate the relation in a single stage among the crude oil prices, the exchange rate and the retail prices of gasoline. The results are in Table 8 and Figure  9 - Figure 11 . The Logistic-ECM is probably the best model now. Figure 9 shows a less nonlinear reaction than Figure 3 but still the main equilibrium adjustment occurs when the crude oil prices are increasing. In summary, as it is shown from Table 6 and Table 8 , the best models explaining the behaviour of prices in the Spanish gasoline market are the DT-ECM, LOGISTIC-ECM and DT-LOGISTIC-ECM. The outputs from these models seem to be robust since the same conclusions can be drawn from them, except for the single stage approach, where it is not so clear which is the best model. Figure 4 and Figure 10 show how prices react more to positive changes in crude oil prices than to negative ones in the first and single stage models, respectively. With regard to the error correction term, in the first stage, Figure 5 exhibits that when prices are above equilibrium levels, there are more changes in the logistic function than when prices are below equilibrium. The opposite happens in the second stage (Figure 8 ). In the single stage (Figure 11 ), prices react similarly independently of the sign of the error correction term. Consider now a detailed analysis of the best asymmetric piece-wise linear model of Table 6-Table 8 , the double threshold error correction models (DT-ECM). These models instead of considering only two possible error correction terms (ecm + and ecm − ), they allow other interactions between the error correction terms and dummy variables ( (12), (13) and (14) . First stage asymmetric double threshold error correction model (DT-ECM):
Retail prices as a function of spot prices (s)
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Second stage asymmetric double threshold error correction model (DT-ECM)
Single stage asymmetric double threshold error correction model (DT-ECM)
As shown in Table 6 - Table 8 , the nonlinear error correction terms with double thresholds of equations (8)- (11) are significant. The main difference of this nonlinear model with prior models discussed in the literature is that it focuses on double short-run asymmetries based on ecm terms. 14 Apart from these two interactions between the asymmetric error correction terms and the dummies for crude price increases and decreases, the model includes some by short run dynamics to make sure that the residuals are white noise. The short-run dynamics follows an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) form in first differences, with the contemporaneous effects of the independent variables and their lags together and lags of the dependent variable (see Table 6 - Table 8 ).
The choice of the number of lags has been selected by minimising the information criteria (Akaike Information Criterion, Bayesian Information Criterion and Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion). Furthermore we also tested if the residuals were homoscedastic (White test) and uncorrelated (Breusch-Godfrey LM tests). There is no evidence of second order autocorrelation, AR (2), but there was evidence of heteroskedasticity and therefore we used White's robust standard errors. Table 6-Table 8 also present the estimated coefficients of the error correction terms used in equations (15)- (17) for Spain. This estimation gives a first idea of the long-run asymmetry by looking at the significance and the magnitude of the coefficients as in Granger and Lee (1989) . Most of the long-run coefficients represented in Table 6-Table 8 are significant except two of them.
Besides significance, comparing the absolute values of the coefficients suggests various remarks. Traditional literature has focused on the comparison between the coefficients of the ecm + and the ecm − , which represent the velocity of adjustment towards equilibrium. Economic intuition states that when the error correction term is positive (ecm > 0), it is because the current price is above its expected long-run equilibrium, therefore prices are higher than expected and they will tend to decrease in the next period to adjust to the equilibrium. Nevertheless, when the error correction term is negative (ecm < 0), it is because the current price is below the long-run equilibrium and it will increase in the next period to reach the equilibrium.
Apart from ensuring that the coefficients for the error terms are individually significant, it is important to perform an F-test to test if those numerical divergences are significant. On the one hand, under the null hypothesis, H 0 :β + + = β + − and H 0 :β − + = β − − , the test checks the long-run asymmetry in prices depending on whether crude oil prices are increasing or decreasing. Rejecting these hypotheses imply that prices adjust differently depending on the sign of crude price changes. On the other hand, if the null, H 0 :β + + = β − + and H 0 :β + − = β − − is rejected; this provides evidence that persistent asymmetries exists between positive and negative error correction terms, when crude prices are rising or falling. Table 9 shows the results obtained from these tests and t-tests for individual significance whenever one of the 2 coefficients that were compared was zero. Asymmetries are found in all the segments of the market. Entries are the p-values computed from the F-test for the null hypothesis of symmetry and from the t-test for individual significance whenever one of the 2 coefficients that were compared was zero. Under the null of the F-tests, coefficients should be equal, representing the same speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium. The combinations that has not been tested through F-tests is because one or both of the coefficients were not significant.
By combining the results of the test in Table 9 and the coefficients in Table 6-Table 8 , some conclusions can be drawn. For the first and the single stage models, the magnitude of the coefficients associated with positive error correction terms are greater than the ones for negative error correction terms. Therefore, it seems that prices are above their equilibrium. This could be explained by some of the theories that we will mention in Section 6, such as the existence of market power, consumer search costs or asymmetric adjustment costs. Furthermore, the speed of adjustment is larger when crude prices are increasing than when they are decreasing. Results differ for the second stage, where different conclusions are reached. In this segment of the market, the coefficients associated with negative error correction terms are greater than those of positive error correction terms. Hence, retail prices are below equilibrium. This could have been a consequence of the recession. If companies know that people are facing financial difficulties, they will slowly adjust prices to avoid a sharp fall in fuel demand.
Economic explanations of the asymmetries
With numerous studies showing empirically that asymmetries exists in the fuel market for several countries, only few economists offered theories explaining this phenomenon.
Market power-collusion
Economic theory suggests that asymmetric movements in prices are connected with imperfect competition. According to Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997) , tacit collusion can be considered to be the main driver of price asymmetries. On the one hand, when international crude oil prices decrease, retailers would be initially reluctant to lower their prices to avoid the risk of starting a price war. This is consistent with our predictions based on model of Figure 3 there is no equilibrium correction in gasoline prices when the oil prices decrease. On the other hand, when oil prices increase, retailers would raise gasoline prices quickly in order to maintain their profit margins. This rapidly increase in retail prices would convince their competitors that they are loyal to the collusive agreement and deviations from that equilibrium will not occur. This is in fact what we observe in Figure 3 and Figure 4 . Only when there is an increase in oil prices (dlcr > 0) there is rapid change in gasoline prices transmitted through the error correction term. Following Motta (2004) , the Spanish fuel market satisfy almost all the characteristics that facilitate collusion. Firstly, there are several entry barriers in all its segments. Examples of legal barriers are the CODO or DODO agreements, which could give rise to foreclosure effects. Furthermore, the fuel market is characterised for being vertically integrated and with a higher HHI. As a consequence, independent retailers, which are not vertically integrated, would probably suffer from higher supply costs due to less beneficial clauses from supply contracts. Furthermore, distribution through CLH can be considered as another entry barrier. Secondly, the fuel demand is very inelastic and the lack of coordination power among consumers allows for anti-competitive practices. Thirdly, the market is very transparent since daily prices are publicly available at the website of the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade. Therefore, each retailer has access to its competitors' prices.
Consumer theory-search costs
Search costs are defined as the time, energy and money spent by consumers when searching for a product. Its existence implies that individual buyers do not always have enough information to take their decisions. Particularly, it is considered that consumers perceive higher search costs when prices decrease than when they increase. Therefore, buyers seek for best prices more actively when prices rise. This is consistent with what we observe in Figure 3 and Figure 4 . When there is a decrease in oil prices (dlcr > 0) there is almost no change in gasoline prices transmitted through the error correction term. The reason is that consumers will have low incentives to search (high search cost) for lower prices. It generates lower pressure on retailers when prices fall, allowing them to reduce competition and maintain tacit collusion (Brown & Yucel, 2000) . Thanks to the public access to daily prices, this type of costs can be reduced in principle. According to the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, the 19th of May 2016, the price of 95 octane gasoline in Madrid vary in 0.187 €/litre from the cheapest to the most expensive petrol station. If your car consumes approximately one deposit of 60 litres per month, you weekly save 2,805€ if you go to the cheapest service station. However, the time spent looking for this offer and the transport costs of reaching the petrol station (search cost) are probably greater than the money saved.
Firm's theory-adjustment costs
This is a less critical argument for oil companies is based on inventory management adjustments, accounting practices, lags in production or asymmetric storage costs. When international crude oil prices fall, national demand increases slightly. Given that the refinery process takes some weeks, market operators raise their sales by reducing the fuel storage, which increments average storage costs. However, when international crude oil price rises, national demand decreases slightly. This provokes a temporary increase in stock, which reduces the average storage costs since operators can take advantage of the economies of scale. This third alternative theory is not able to clearly explain the observed asymmetries behaviour in the prices of gasoline.
Conclusions
This paper tested the consumers' complaint that retail gasoline prices react faster to crude oil price increases than to decreases. The relevance of fuel products into people's daily lives have attracted the attention of economists and competition authorities, which have studied the fuel market in detail for several countries. So far, no consensus has been reached for the Spanish sector since most of empirical analysis previously done did not find strong empirical evidence of asymmetric price behaviour.
In comparison with traditional asymmetric price theory literature, this study introduces new double threshold nonlinear models and compares them with the more common linear error correction models; threshold autoregressive ECM models (T-ECM), smooth transition regression (STR) models and nonlinear error correction (NEC) models. This was performed using updated weekly data for the 2011-2016 period. To tackle the rockets and feathers phenomenon, these models use the error correction term (equilibrium correction) as the channel to transmit the increases in oil prices in increases in gasoline prices.
These new models employed gain flexibility by introducing double threshold error correction terms; the error correction terms not only depends on whether the error is positive or negative but also on whether the crude oil prices are rising or falling. Furthermore, the different nonlinear ECM's are developed for the different stages of the production and distribution chain. This approach allows us to identify in which segment of the market the short-run asymmetries occur. The results obtained show that short-run asymmetries exist and they differ with the stage and with the period analysed.
The coefficients associated with positive error correction terms are greater (in absolute value) than the ones for negative error correction terms. More reaction is observed when the cointegrated prices tend to be above their long run equilibrium values. This behaviour of the oil companies was justified by the existence of market power-collusion and consumer having search costs. The speed of adjustment was higher when crude prices increases than when they decrease.
However, in the second stage of the Spanish market, the reaction to negative error correction terms were greater than those of the positive error correction terms. Hence, when retail prices were mainly below long run equilibrium spot prices, maybe as a consequence of the recession since the 2007/2008 financial crises, the increases in gasoline prices was faster, once again consistent with the existence of market power-collusion and/or consumer having search costs.
The asymmetric results found in Spain in the oils sector, show that sophisticated bivariate short-run nonlinearities are present in the gasoline market prices and that those price reactions depend on two main aspects; whether the oil price increases or decreases and on the stage (above of below) of the prices of gasoline relative to their long-run expected crude oil prices (error correction term).
Possible extensions include the analysis of the differential behaviour of retail gasoline prices in other European countries (Germany, France, etc.) with the possibility of allowing also for similar asymmetric behaviour in variance (asymmetric GARCH). The authors are currently working on these extensions but they are out of the scope of this paper. 
